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Can
the U.S. financial crisis be contained within America's borders?
For months, economists have debated whether the United
States is headed toward a recession. Today, there is no doubt. The severe
liquidity and credit crunch from the subprime mortgage bust is now spreading
to broader credit markets, $100 barrels of oil are squeezing consumers
and unemployment continues to climb. And with the housing market melting
down, empty-pocketed Americans can no longer use their homes as ATMs
to fund their shopping sprees. It's time to face the truth: The U.S.
economy is no longer merely battling a touch of the flu; it's now in
the early stages of a painful and persistent bout of pneumonia.
Canada and other countries are watching anxiously, hoping
they don't get sick, too. In recent years, the global economy has been
unbalanced, with Americans spending more than they earn and the country
running massive external deficits. When the subprime mortgage crisis
first hit headlines last year, observers hoped that the rest of the
world had enough growth momentum and domestic demand to gird itself
from the U.S. slowdown. But making up for slowing U.S. demand will be
difficult, if not impossible. American consumers spend about $9-trillion
a year. Compare that to Chinese consumers, who spend roughly $1-trillion
a year, or Indian consumers, who spend only about $600-billion. Even
in wealthy European and Japanese households, low income growth and insecurities
about the global economy have caused consumers to save rather than spend.
Meanwhile, countries such as China rely on exports to sustain their
high economic growth. So there's little reason to believe that global
buyers will pick up the slack of today's faltering American consumer,
whose spending has already begun to drop.
Because the United States is such a huge part of the global
economy -- it accounts for about 25% of the world's GDP, and an even
larger percentage of international financial transactions -- there's
real reason to worry that an American financial virus could mark the
beginning of a global economic contagion. It may not devolve into a
worldwide recession, but at the very least, other nations should expect
sharp economic downturns, too. Here's how it will happen:
TRADE WILL DROP
If output and demand in the United States fall -- something that by
definition would happen in a recession -- the resulting decline in private
consumption, capital spending by companies and production would lead
to a drop in imports of consumer goods, capital goods, commodities and
other raw materials from abroad. U.S. imports are other countries' exports,
as well as an important part of their overall demand. So such a scenario
would spell a drop in their economic growth rates, too. Several significant
economies -- including Canada, China, Japan, Mexico, South Korea and
much of Southeast Asia -- are heavily dependent on exports to the United
States. China, in particular, is at risk because so much of its double-digit
annual growth has relied on the uptick of exports to the United States.
Americans are the world's biggest consumers, and China is one of the
world's largest exporters. But with Americans reluctant to buy, where
would Chinese goods go?
China is also a good example of how indirect trade links would suffer
in an American recession. It once was the case that Asian manufacturing
hubs such as South Korea and Taiwan produced finished goods, like consumer
electronics, that were exported directly to American retailers. But
with the rise of Chinese competitiveness in manufacturing, the pattern
of trade in Asia has changed: Asian countries increasingly produce components,
such as computer chips, for export to China. China then takes these
component parts and assembles them into finished goods -- say, a personal
computer -- and exports them to American consumers. Therefore, if U.S.
imports fall, then Chinese exports to the United States would fall.
If Chinese exports fall, then Chinese demand for component parts from
the rest of Asia would fall, spreading the economic headache further.
HOUSING BUBBLES WILL BURST WORLDWIDE
The United States also isn't the only country that has experienced
a housing bust: Britain, Ireland and Spain lag only slightly behind
the United States as the value of their flats and villas trends downward.
Countries with smaller but still substantial real estate bubbles include
France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Turkey and the Baltic nations.
Countries including Australia, China, New Zealand and Singapore have
also experienced modest housing bubbles. There's even been a housing
boom in parts of India. Inevitably, such bubbles will burst, as a credit
crunch and higher interest rates poke holes in them, leading to a domestic
economic slowdown for some and outright recession for others.
COMMODITY PRICES WILL FALL
One need only look at the skyrocketing price of oil to see that worldwide
demand for commodities has surged in recent years. But those high prices
won't last for long. That's because a slowdown of the U.S. and Chinese
economies -- the two locomotives of global growth -- will cause a sharp
drop in the demand for commodities such as oil, energy, food and minerals.
The ensuing fall in the prices of those commodities will hurt the exports
and growth rate of commodity exporters in Asia, Latin America and Africa.
Take Chile, for example, the world's biggest producer of copper, which
is widely used for computer chips and electrical wiring. As demand from
the United States and China falls, the price of copper, and therefore
Chile's exports of it, will also start to slide.
FINANCIAL CONFIDENCE WILL FALTER
The fallout from the U.S. subprime meltdown has already festered into
a broader and more severe liquidity and credit crunch on Wall Street.
That, in turn, has spilled over to financial markets in other parts
of the world. This financial contagion is impossible to contain. A huge
portion of the risky, radioactive U.S. securities that have now collapsed
-- such as the now disgraced residential mortgage-backed securities
and collateralized debt obligations -- were sold to foreign investors.
That's why financial losses from defaulting mortgages in American cities
such as Cleveland, Las Vegas and Phoenix are now showing up in Australia
and Europe, even in small villages in Norway.
Consumer confidence outside the United States -- especially in Europe
and Japan -- was never strong; it can only become weaker as an onslaught
of lousy economic news in the United States dampens the spirits of consumers
worldwide. And as losses on their U.S. operations hit their books, large
multinational firms may decide to cut back new spending on factories
and machines, not just in the United States but everywhere. European
corporations will be hit especially hard, as they depend on bank lending
more than American firms do. The emerging global credit crunch will
limit their ability to produce, hire and invest.
MONEY FOR NOTHING
Optimists may believe that central banks can save the world from the
painful side effects of an American recession. They may point to the
world's recovery from the 2001 recession as a reason for hope. Back
then, the U.S. Federal Reserve slashed interest rates from 6.5% to 1%,
the European Central Bank dropped its rate from 4% to 2% and the Bank
of Japan cut its rate down to zero. But today, the ability of central
banks to use monetary tools to stimulate their economies and dampen
the effect of a global slowdown is far more limited than in the past.
Central banks don't have as free a hand; they are constrained by higher
levels of inflation. The Fed is cutting interest rates once again, but
it must worry how the disorderly fall of the dollar could cause foreign
investors to pull back on their financing of massive U.S. debts. A weaker
dollar is a zero-sum game in the global economy; it may benefit the
United States, but it hurts the competitiveness and growth of America's
trading partners.
Monetary policy will also be less effective this time around because
there is an oversupply of housing, automobiles and other consumer goods.
Demand for these goods is less sensitive to changes in interest rates,
because it takes years to work out such gluts. A simple tax rebate can
hardly be expected to change this fact, especially when credit card
debt is mounting and mortgages and auto loans are coming due.
The United States is facing a financial crisis that goes far beyond
the subprime problem into areas of economic life that the Fed simply
can't reach. The problems the U.S. economy faces are no longer just
about not having enough cash on hand; they're about insolvency, and
monetary policy is ill equipped to deal with such problems. Millions
of households are on the verge of defaulting on their mortgages. Not
only have more than 100 subprime lenders gone bankrupt, there are riding
delinquencies on more run-of-the-mill mortgages, too. Financial distress
has even spread to the kinds of loans that finance excessively risky
leveraged buyouts and commercial real estate.
There is also much less room today for fiscal policy stimulus, because
the United States, Europe and Japan all have structural deficits. During
the last recession, the United States underwent a nearly 6% change in
fiscal policy, from a very large surplus of about 2.5% of GDP in 2000
to a large deficit of about 3.2% of GDP in 2004. But this time, the
United States is already running a large structural deficit, and the
room for fiscal stimulus is only 1% of GDP, as recently agreed upon
in George W. Bush's stimulus package. The situation is similar for Europe
and Japan.
President Bush's fiscal stimulus package is too small to make a major
difference today, and what the Fed is doing now is too little too late.
It will take years to resolve the problems that led to this crisis.
Poor regulation of mortgages, a lack of transparency about complex financial
products, misguided incentive schemes in the compensation of bankers,
wrongheaded credit ratings, poor risk management by financial institutions
-- the list goes on and on.
Ultimately, in today's flat world, interdependence boosts growth across
countries in good times. Unfortunately, these trade and financial links
also mean that an economic slowdown in one place can drag down everyone
else. Not every country will follow the United States into an outright
recession, but no one can claim to be immune. - Nouriel Roubini is chairman
of RGE Monitor and professor of economics at New York University's Stern
School of Business.
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